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In New Zealand recently, a non-binding decision
in the Youth Court at Manukau, a division of the
District Court, attracted world-wide media
coverage and interest because of an unusual
attempt by the judge to control internet coverage
of aspects of the case. 
In New Zealand Police v KOrs,1 Judge Harvey made a
partial non-publication order in relation to proceedings
before him where three defendants were charged with
offences relating to a murder. This order allowed
publication of reports about the proceedings in
contemporaneous broadcasts or publications. Thus,
contemporaneous reporting in newspapers and on
television and radio was unrestricted. However,
accounts on the internet, or by way of placing of stored
audio, video or text files on the internet, were
prohibited. This sort of partial suppression order had
not been seen before in New Zealand. The decision and
the suppressed details in it were almost immediately
commented on by overseas bloggers on-line, and in one
case, a Canadian on-line news outlet carried a version of
the story containing the suppressed details. The
decision was seen by bloggers in the United States of
America in particular as a restriction of freedom of
expression and unenforceable. Many of these bloggers
had clearly not read the decision itself. Furthermore,
these criticisms are not new, as it is by no means the
first time the internet has been the subject of
suppression orders in New Zealand.
This case involved two adult accused jointly charged
with a young person in relation to offences arising from
the murder of a young man. The charges were heard
together in the Youth Court, where reporting of
proceedings is automatically suppressed unless leave of
the court is given,2 and the name of the young accused
cannot be disclosed.3 The decision was an exercise by
Judge Harvey of his discretion to give leave for the
proceedings to be reported. Therefore, the judge was
attempting to open the proceedings up to more scrutiny,
rather than less. He chose to do this by allowing
contemporaneous reporting, but did not permit storage
of that reporting on the internet. Thus, the names and
images of the two adult accused were made public on
radio, television and in newspapers and have therefore
been available to the New Zealand public.
It is clear from the judgment, that the judge’s main
concern was to prevent the creation of searchable
internet records which could be used by members of a
jury at a later trial. He said, at paragraph 5: ‘The intent
of the limited order was to ensure that at a later stage,
any concerns about a fair trial would not be prejudiced
as a result of the availability of information stored on
the internet. Potential jurors could, if such material were
available, have reference to it which could well have an
adverse affect upon a fair trial.’ Judge Harvey’s specific
concern about the internet being the main source of
such prejudice, and his method of dealing with his
concerns, is novel. This method has been somewhat
undermined, however, by the disproportionate attention
his order received. The case is continuing, and the judge
advised the media he would hear submissions from
them about issues of suppression when the order fell
for reconsideration. The judge has now looked at the
matter again and reaffirmed his original decision.4 The
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1 Unreported, Youth Court, Manukau, 25 August
2008, Judge Harvey.
2 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act
1989, s 438(1).
3 Section 438(3).
4 New Zealand Police v KOrs, Unreported, Youth
Court, Manukau, 3 September 2008, Judge Harvey.
judge noted that no member of the media made
submissions, and no counsel opposed the continuation
of the order.
In New Zealand, discretionary suppression is most
commonly exercised under s 140 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1985, which gives open discretion to judges in
criminal cases to suppress publication of the name of
persons involved in the proceedings or of any
particulars likely to identify them. The starting point is
the principal of open justice, and the person requesting
suppression must make out a clear case. The leading
cases are R v Liddell5 and Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd.6
In granting suppression, the courts have regard to the
nature and seriousness of the charge, the likely extent
of publicity, and the likely effects of publication on the
individual and those associated him or her. Distress,
embarrassment and adverse effects on the accused,
such as financial, are insufficient unless out of the
ordinary. Serious offences do not usually attract
suppression, and this is so in relation to sexual offences
in particular (unless the victim will be identified).
New Zealand Police v KOrs did not involve an exercise
of s 140 discretion. However, in his second decision,
Judge Harvey acknowledged that the principles applying
to those sections are of assistance in deciding whether
publication would be permitted under the Children,
Young Persons and their Families Act.7 He then
addressed evidence which tended to support the
continuation of the order, and referred to cases which
noted the importance of preserving the right to a fair
trial not only for the accused, but also for the public to
maintain overall confidence in the administration of
justice, recognised the inevitable tension between
freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial, noted
a prominent Australian case where media specific and
internet non-publication orders have been made,8 and
referred to a recent New Zealand Court of Appeal
decision where the court had acknowledged the
possibility of jurors undertaking a search of the internet
to find information on the accused, and commented that
there is no perfect way for judges to deal with the
availability of prejudicial material on the internet.9
Because no media were in court to make submissions
opposing the order, the judge identified possible
arguments himself. He thought that arguments about
the unprecedented nature of the order should fail
because similar orders had been issued in other
jurisdictions (such as Australia in the ‘Underbelly’ case,
and France in the ‘Yahoo’ case10), in Germany to enforce
obscenity laws, and in New Zealand itself to protect
anti-smoking legislation.11 In Judge Harvey’s view, the
internet is simply not a ‘law free zone’12 because there
is existing and developed jurisprudence regulating it.13
Judge Harvey also addressed the tension between the
need for a fair trial and the right to free speech, which
are represented in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990.14 He concluded briefly that existing New Zealand
case law affirms that the right to a fair trial can override
all, and additionally suggested his ‘postponed
publication order’ is a way of resolving the tension.15
Following Judge Harvey’s first decision, the author
was of the tentative view that the best way for this case
to be dealt with now may be for a strong instruction to
the jury when the matter finally comes on for hearing in
about a year, and not to use the internet when members
retire to consider their verdict. This happened in New
Zealand during a series of prominent historic rape trials,
which began in March 2006 where two former police
officers had been convicted previously of rape in 1989
and were serving prison sentences at the time they
faced two later trials. Suppression orders continued
after the first trial, but these were breached. Protestors
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5 [1995] 1 NZLR 538.
6 [2000] 3 NZLR 546.
7 Paragraph 10.
8 General Television Corporation Pty Limited v
Director of Public Prosecutions, (2008) VSCA 49 –
the ‘Underbelly’ case.
9 Paragraph 57.
10 LICRA and UEJEF v Yahoo (Tribunal De Grande
Instance Paris, No RG: 005308, 22 May 2000).
11 Paragraphs 63-64.
12 Paragraph 65.
13 Paragraph 66.
14 See ss. 25 and 14. This Act is not supreme law, but
interpretative only. Rights in it are weighed in a
balancing process. Rights jurisprudence in New
Zealand is nascent.
15 Paragraph 68.
In granting suppression, the courts have regard to the
nature and seriousness of the charge, the likely extent of
publicity, and the likely effects of publication on the
individual and those associated him or her.
believed the juries should have known about the prior
convictions, and this led to convictions for contempt
after the 2006 trial. Only one member of the media,
RadioWorks, breached the suppression orders, and was
fined NZ$750. Otherwise, the information was circulated
by members of the public through pamphleteering and
was available on the internet at various times, in
particular on the Trade Me web site. Although the court
took action to have that material removed, the accused
applied for a stay of prosecution of the last trial, on the
grounds that they would not be able to obtain a fair
trial. In dealing with that application in R v Rickards,
Shipton and Schollum,16 Randerson J took a robust
view, and thought a fair trial was still possible if the trial
judge gave clear instructions to the jury. Although the
precise approach would have to take account of the
circumstances at the time of the trial, Randerson J
suggested that the trial judge should take a direct
approach, raise the pre-trial publicity at the outset, and
refer to the original trial and the outcome, the likelihood
that at least some members of the jury had heard about
it and the suppressed information, remind jury
members of their oath, and excuse any jury members if
they had doubts about their ability to deal with the
evidence fairly.17 At the subsequent and final trial, the
jury did indeed appear to be able to put the information
out of their minds, and acquitted all of the accused.
Judge Harvey addresses this suggested course in his
second decision.18 He pointed out that potential jury
contamination can only arise if the information is there
in the first place, and supports his approach by
outlining how Google searches usually rank newspaper
reports highly in search returns. The judge makes clear
that his aim was to significantly reduce the amount of
information available to potential jurors by eliminating a
potential search string on news websites – if such
information is not on the websites, then there will be no
hits.
Judge Harvey also scrutinised the main concern
expressed about his first decision, which was the lack of
enforceability based on a view that the internet cannot
be censored.19 He rejected this, pointing out that no
order is completely enforceable, and all orders can be
undermined in some way. Suppression in particular has
always been a bit of a blunt instrument. But Judge
Harvey obviously shares the pragmatic view of most
New Zealand judges, who persist in the belief that if
most of the information which is causing concern can be
kept from most of the relevant audience, then orders are
still worth making. Indeed, a case law search carried out
by the author reveals that over the period of nine
months during 2008, twenty-one New Zealand
suppression decisions have been made, ordering that
information not be published in news media or on
internet or public databases until the final disposition of
trial. There has been no outcry about the enforceability
of those decisions, although they do, of course, differ
from that made by Judge Harvey, in that they were not
partial.
Judge Harvey made clear that the fact that breaches of
suppression orders can occur on the internet does not
excuse such actions, because information does not just
‘appear’ on the internet. He developed his view of a
form of facilitatory liability arising in relation to internet
publication. The judge stated, at paragraph 73, that:
‘It requires direct or indirect human intervention. It is
important to remember that such information first
emanates from New Zealand and is transmitted by
means of internet communications protocols (which
is still publication) to the administrator of the off-
shore website. Such action is still a facilitatory step
towards the commission of the breach of the non-
publication order …. publication on the internet takes
place where the information is received and
comprehended.’
16 Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CRI 2005-063-
1122, 25 May 2006.
17 Unreported, High Court, Auckland, CRI 2005-063-
1122, 25 May 2006, 60-67.
18 Paragraphs 69-71.
19 Paragraphs 72-74.
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The judge makes clear that his aim was to significantly reduce the
amount of information available to potential jurors by eliminating a
potential search string on news websites – if such information is
not on the websites, then there will be no hits.
20 J. Burrows and U. Cheer, Media Law in New Zealand
(2005, 5th edn, OUP), 339.
21 Paragraph 74.
22 Paragraph 76.
23 Paragraphs 77-78.
This is certainly arguable by analogy with the example
of information being leaked over the telephone by
someone in New Zealand to an overseas publication
such as a newspaper.20
On the issue of lack of enforceability bringing the law
into disrepute, the judge forcefully defended the value
of trying to protect the right to fair trial, and suggested
that it ‘is perhaps better for the law to recognise that
there is a problem and attempt to do something about it
rather than put it into the “too hard” basket for another
day and risk injustice.’21
Finally, the judge dealt with an argument that his
order implied that internet publication will be stifled in
all cases22 and rejected this, emphasising that some, but
not all, circumstances will justify postponed publication
under a partial order. He identified these as high profile
and sensational cases, where publicity is intense, public
sentiments run high and media coverage is at saturation
levels.23 Judge Harvey emphasised once again that in
such cases, the interests at stake in relation to fair trial
are not only personal to the accused but also public, in
the administration of justice generally. He concluded,
finally, that his interim order should continue and
clarified the point at paragraph 79:
‘… this means that publication of the names or
images of the defendants on or by way of stored
video or images on any website or internet server is
prohibited. Publication of names and images in the
“traditional” print medium is permitted as is
publication of names and images on a
contemporaneous radio or TV broadcast. Publication
by means of the internet is prohibited. Names and
images cannot be made available on a website.
Because “blogs” utilise web technology and
protocols they are necessarily included. Publication
by means of enabling the names and images of the
defendants to be obtained from an internet server are
prohibited. This is wide-ranging and is intended to
be, given that all information on the internet is
retained upon and made available from servers.’
This decision is not novel because it deals with
suppression of the internet. It is novel in that it attempts
to pre-empt a ‘cyber memory’ effect which the judge has
accepted will turn harmless publication today into
prejudicial publication a year later during a trial. The
judge acknowledged the order may not be completely
enforceable, but was satisfied that it is enforceable
enough to be effective, however.
As he completed the reasons for his decision, Judge
Harvey received late submissions from media interests.
He has agreed to hear further argument on 12
September 2008. It would be expected that such
submissions will deal forcefully with Bill of Rights
arguments, with the scope of the order and once again,
with enforceability and effectiveness.
© Ursula Cheer, 2008
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